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ECONOMIC FAILURE PLAGUES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES'
IRRIGATION:  AN ASSURANCE PROBLEM
by K. William Easter
As is well documented in the literature, many developing countries
have neglected the operation and maintenance  (O&M)  of their irrigation
projects, which has resulted in a rapid depreciation of past irrigation
investments  (Carruthers, 1981;  Easter,  1987). 1 Irrigation projects  fail
to  irrigate their planned or projected command areas  and after a few
years, parts of the systems no longer function (Wade, 1975).  There are
too few farmer or government agency incentives which foster investment of
capital and human resources in O&M because of the weak linkage between
those providing O&M and those benefitting from O&M.
"Concern with O&M is not a new issue, and indeed, there are
precedents in provision of resources to sustain O&M.  The new
dimension is  the apparent scale of the problem and the likely
trend.  Unease with the scale of deficit operating performance
of irrigation schemes stems  from a variety of sources  ......
Tangible evidence of general need comes from the increasing
number of rehabilitation projects being implemented in
countries  as diverse as Mexico, Nepal, and Indonesia,"
(Carruthers, 1981, p. 53).
*Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics.  The author would
like  to thank M.L. Livingston and Daniel W. Bromely for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1Operation and maintenance  includes the management of water supplies
and the upkeep of system facilities  from the water source  to the farmers'
fields.  Operation means the allocation and delivery of water supplies,
including the management of any storage facilities,  and handling of
drainage runoff.  Maintenance  is the upkeep of irrigation and drainage
structures, embankments, dams, outlets, and channels and the removal of
silt and vegetation from canals and storage facilities.2
In contrast  to this bleak picture,  there are a number of  irrigation
systems in which O&M has been quite adequately performed.  This  is
particularly true  in a number of communal systems.  Bali Indonesia
provides one of the best examples of well operated communal or  traditional
irrigation systems  in Asia (Coward, 1986).  Here a community builds, owns,
operates and maintains a very complex irrigation system.  The community  of
water users has complete responsibility for O&M, which continues  to be
conducted in a very effective manner.
Why Poor Irrigation Performance?
There is  no one reason for  these differences  in performance across
systems and countries.  In some cases,  the low relative economic value of
water does not warrant  investments  in institutional change,2 capital
investments or administrative efforts  to  improve water delivery and/or
reduce water losses  (Young,  1985, and Young and Haveman, 1985).  The  low
value of water compared to the high cost of  improving water transportation
and control, along with the high transaction costs3 of increasing farmer
2Institutional change may be necessary to  reduce uncertainty.  "An
economic system operates with the aid of indispensable rules and
conventions which are collectively referred to  as institutions.  An
essential element in the creative activities  of entrepreneurs  is some
degree of predictability over  these institutional arrangements--property
rights are the essence of predictability  in these rules and conventions.
When such rules are only selectively followed--or are changed in an
arbitrary manner--the best plans of entrepreneurs are confounded.
Irrigation systems are characterized by institutional uncertainty in that
the rules and conventions  for water allocation are more often than not
ignored by some of the  irrigators,"  (Bromley, 1982, p. 3).  In other
cases,  institutional arrangements do not even exist for water allocation.
3Transaction costs  include costs of obtaining information such as
the water requirements of farmers and their production levels,  contracting
costs  required to conclude agreements with farmers and the cost of
policing and enforcing rules and agreements.3
participation  in O&M,  leads to declining system performance.  In other
cases,  the public or collective good character of water makes  it very
difficult to organize  to provide water at the  time and in the quantities
demanded by farmers.  Finally,  there  is  the classic case of government
failure due either to rent seeking behavior or poor public management
(Krueger,  1974).
Collective goods  aspects
There are the basic problems associated with jointness in supplying4
irrigation water and the difficulty of excluding farmers located along
irrigation canals or over ground water aquifers.  A farmer's contribution
to O&M typically confers benefits on the group of farmers served by the
same canal or outlet,  thus creating a technological externality.5 In
addition, those at  the head-reaches of a canal will gain few of the
benefits, while  those in the tail-reaches receive the most benefits from
4Jointness in supply when providing irrigation water has,  at  least,
three aspects.  First, the reservoir used to store irrigation water is
likely to be used to provide other goods and services such as  flood
control and domestic water supplies.  Second,  the water  itself may provide
other goods and services such as hydropower,  recreation and commercial
fishing before it  is used for  irrigation.  Finally, there are  the
interdependence problems that are created when farmers are jointly
supplied from the same pump, river diversion or canal outlet.
5Technological externalities are present whenever an irrigator's
production or utility function includes real  (non-monetary) variables
which are selected or  influenced by other irrigations (Bromley, 1982,  p.
3).  These externalities cause both inefficiency and inequity in
irrigation system.  Farmers pumping from the same aquifer may reduce the
ground water level and increase  the cost of pumping for each other.
Externalities also arise when one  farmer's diversion and use of water from
a river or canal reduces  the amount or quality of water available for
farmers downstream.  In addition,  the externality can occur just from a
delay in the timing or a reduction in the reliability of water delivered
downstream.4
improved O&M.  The uneven distribution of benefits clearly influences
farmer incentives  to contribute to O&M.  In analyzing these problems,
should the emphasis be on:  (1) the  "free  rider" or egoistic motivations
of farmers or,  alternatively, upon  (2)  other incentives,  such as farmer
concerns for fairness and the need to provide assurance regarding the
actions of others?
As pointed out above, we observe cases where farmers do  not
contribute to O&M ("free rider")  as well as  cases where they do.  Thus,
the  "free  rider" model does not provide a complete answer  to the  question
concerning the range of irrigation performance  in providing O&M.  In
contrast, work done by Runge,  1984, and Sugden, 1984,  suggest  that a more
complete framework is provided by the principles of assurance and
reciprocity in conjunction with the idea of fairness.  "The reciprocity
principle says, with certain qualification, that if everyone else
contributes a particular level of effort to  the production of a public
good, you must do the  same,"  (Sugden, 1984, p.776).  This contribution can
be in terms of labor,  absolute money amounts, relative money amounts,
commodities and equipment services,  or  some combination of them.
The  idea of reciprocity can be included in the more general concept
of assurance.  If assurance  is provided that members  of a group will
contribute to the collective good,  it can significantly influence  the
willingness to  contribute of other group members.
"In the AP (assurance problem),  the particular outcome depends
crucially both on prior expectations and on a preference for
coordinating one's own actions with the actions of others.
These expectations  are formed by institutions  that facilitate
the coordination of behavior by providing prior information.  If
public goods problems are perceived by many people as AP's,
this has  implications  for the structure of incentives likely to
yield voluntary contributions.  Where people are motivated to5
contribute and if this behavior is  also expected of others,
institutions which convince  them that these expectations are
justified can promote voluntary provision of public goods.  This
does not imply that voluntary contributions can supply all
necessary public goods.  However, that significant  incentives
exist,  internal to any group,  to contribute voluntarily,  implies
that public goods can, in some cases, be provided without
coercion or  selective side-payments from outside the group,"
(Runge, 1984, p.158).
"The AP acknowledges  that incentives  exist to free ride  if this
behavior  is expected of others,  but implies that the assurance
that others will contribute  their fair share increases the
likelihood that one will contribute  too.  The problem is:  how
can one predict the actions of others with assurance?
"Assurance is  a matter of degree.  The ability to predict the
behavior  of others is  subject to varying limits of confidence
...  Political  and economic institutions  can increase  this mutual
predictability,  reducing uncertainty and stabilizing
expectations by coordinating individual  choice  ...  Adhering to
such institutions can be its  own reward, leading to  stability
over time  if others are expected to adhere  to  them too."
(Runge, 1984,  p. 162).
Contributions towards a collective or public good will depend on
expectations of group members and the  potential size of the gain from
contributing as  compared to non-contributing.  The expectations are
contingent on individuals'  abilities to predict what others will do  and
are affected by institutions which influence the actions of others.
Expectations are also affected over  time by the contributing behavior of
others and institutions that provide information about likely behaviors
over  time.  Contributions will be small  if gains from cooperation are
small,  predictions of what others will do  (assurance)  is difficult,  or the
probability of others contributing is  small.
Water users as  a group have the option to contribute to  the provision
of a collective or public good.  They benefit from receiving a more
assured water supply but, in return,  they must contribute resources  to O&M
of the system.  What conditions and institutions appear to raise water6
users' assurance and contributions?  Abel,  1977,  explains how institutions
and penalties were used effectively in Taiwan to  elicit the desired farmer
contributions  for O&M.
"The members of an irrigation association are entitled to
irrigation water and other benefits  and are required to pay fees
and perform duties for the association.  Non-compliance  of a
member with the obligations  imposed on him by law and regulation
can lead to a suspension of rights to water and other benefits."
(page 35).
The laws and regulations make it clear what is expected of association
members,  while the loss of rights makes  it expensive not to perform.
These institutions and penalties provide members assurance  that other
members are not likely to free ride.
Fairness
Another important consideration in O&M is  the  question of fairness.
This,  combined with benefits  (rates of return) and stability of
expectations  (provided by assurance), appears to be  the major factor
guiding farmers'  contributions to O&M for irrigation systems.  Fairness is
based on the idea that a distribution is  fair if it involves no envy by
any individual of any other individual  (Baumol, 1982).  In an irrigation
system,  this would mean that farmers at the end of a canal would not be
envious of those at the head of a canal.  In other words,  they would not
have a desire to change places with those at the head of the canal.
Fairness  is also similar  to Rawls'  principles of compatible  liberty and
justice which preclude "an individual or group from enjoying undue
influence over water receipts,  systems maintenance, or  system
enforcement,"  (Bromley, et al.,  1980, p. 377).7
One good illustration of fairness being introduced into irrigation
through the water allocation rules  is the case where water is  delivered
first  to  those at the end of the  canal.  Rules for equal distribution of
water based on crop water requirements is  another example of fairness.  In
theory,  everyone  should get enough water to  grow the  crop or crops  they
select to plant.  However,  in most irrigation systems,  everyone cannot
receive water at the same time.  Thus,  those in the tail-reaches of the
system will have to wait longer for water unless  specific allocation rules
are adopted that make adjustments  for location.  Set rotation schedules
that change from year to year can be devised so  that different locations
are given priority.  For example,  the  irrigated area can be divided into
three sections designated A, B, and C, with section C being the tail-
reaches.  In the first year, section C might have priority followed by A
and B while in the second year section A would have priority followed by B
and C.  The third year would find section B with first priority.  When
more than one  crop season is  available, priorities could be varied by
season.  Again, such rotation schedules show a concern for fairness.
Since the distribution of O&M benefits usually depend on the  farm's
location along the canal  (the  tail-reaches obtain the most benefits from
improved O&M),  rules may have to be designed which assign responsibilities
and assess contributions for O&M based on locational differences.
Traditionally, contributions of labor for O&M have been related to farm
size, with the larger farms required to  provide more labor.  A similar
strategy has been used to account for location benefits.  Farmers  all
along a canal  are required to help clean and maintain the upper reaches of
the canal as well as the reaches near their farms.  Those in the tail-8
reaches must help maintain the whole canal, while those in the upper-
reaches only help maintain the upper canal.  A slight variation in this
model is when all farmers start cleaning at the head of the canal and
continuing cleaning down to the  outlet, which irrigates their own field or
fields.  Assuming the  initial distribution of land holdings is  agreed
upon,  then these rules provide a "fair" match between the costs and
benefits of canal maintenance.
This arrangement does not completely square with Baumol's fairness
criteria, because  those in the tail-reaches  of the system would rather be
in the upper-reaches.  Only the rule which allocates water to  the  tail-
reaches first appears  to approach Baumol's criteria.
In a number of communal  irrigation systems,  farmers have  land located
in different parts of the irrigated area.  This helps circumvent the
problem of location benefits  (advantages).  It may also help with problems
associated with a limited family labor supply, since farmers can have
different cultivation schedules for different plots of land.  Planting
would start in the head-reaches and moves down the  system.  Farmers can
stagger their planting and harvesting to better suit their labor and
water supply availability.
Government failure
Another explanation of the difficulties involved in providing O&M for
irrigation has been the  idea of government failure and rent seeking.  Rent
seeking is  simply the attempts by potential recipients  to  capture economic
rents created by government  investments or restrictions upon economic
activity.  The competition for these rents can be perfectly legal or9
involve  such things as bribery and corruption (Krueger, 1974,  Repetto,
1986).  In the case of irrigation,  these economic rents can be
substantial, and competition for them can lead to undesirable social
behavior.
"Successful rent-seekers can well afford to spend a portion of
their rents to safeguard, defend, and increase them.  These
defensive expenditures finance organizational efforts,  political
contributions and lobbying,  and activities  or investments  that
strengthen rent-seekers' claims to the resources being
allocated.  Over time,  the mechanisms by which successful rent-
seekers obtain their gains become extremely well entranced and
defended.
"Those who control  the allocation of rents, whether
administratively or politically, are  in a position of power
relative  to rent-seekers because they are dispensing rights to
resources for which excess demand is chronic.  They typically
find ways to appropriate a share of those rents  for themselves--
often through corruption and monetary gain, but also in other
forms.  Politicians gain votes and contributions, and public
agencies gain expanded budgets,  staffs,  and authority,"
(Repetto, 1986, p. 14).
In terms of external  assurance,  government failure is  an important
cause  of inadequate O&M.  Because of the lack of incentives  and/or
resources,  the irrigation agency does not provide adequate O&M.  This,  of
course,  influences what water users will contribute as  they look to  the
irrigation agency for assurance concerning the delivery of adequate water
supplies.  Water users usually have limited influence over the performance
of irrigation officials unless the officials'  salaries and other rewards
are determined by water users.  In Taiwan, water users did have  influence
over irrigation management and this provided the needed external assurance
and resulted in high irrigation performance.
"In the case of Taiwan, the rewards to management are determined
by the elected representatives of the members of irrigation
associations.  And there is  evidence that irrigation
associations do reward good management and do penalize poor
management.  The reward structure includes financial returns to10
management, promotions,  and nonmonetary recognitions such as
prizes.  In contrast,  systems where management is  divorced from
water users have incentive structures for management which are
usually not linked or are linked weakly to  the operating
efficiency of the irrigation system...
"Another important aspect of the incentive system is  the
interrelationship between the collection of irrigation fees and
financing the operations of an irrigation association.  The
operating budget of an irrigation association depends directly
on the collection of water fees from farmers.  In order  to
preserve their jobs,  the technical and administrative staffs  of
an irrigation association have a strong interest in ensuring the
collection of fees.  If collections are poor, revenue will not
be adequate  to cover operating costs and will eventually result
in a reduction in the  size of the staff of the association.
"The willingness of farmers to pay their fees  depends heavily on
how well the irrigation associations are operated,  i.e.,  the
amount and timeliness  of water received.  The better the system
is managed, the more willing the farmers will be to pay their
fees.  This  is also true for voluntary farmer participation in
certain operations of the system, such as controlling the
release of water  into fields,  performing maintenance work on the
portion of the system located near their farms,  etc.  Thus, job
security and levels of remuneration for management personnel are
tied directly to how well a system is managed,"  (Abel,  1977, p.
41-42)
However, preventing government failure does not provide a complete
answer to the O&M problem,  since cases can be found where government
operated projects work well and where non-government projects have
inadequate O&M.  The need to  provide assurances and incentives within an
irrigation organization seems  to be a more complete approach.  Thus,  a
model that explicitly considers the need to provide assurances and
positive  incentives within government and among water users,  offers a
better framework for understanding the differences  in irrigation
performance.  Add to  this the degree to which there exists a commitment to
contribute resources for O&M and a sense of fairness derived from the
water allocation rules,  and the result is  a model that can explain
performance in providing O&M.Providing assurance
In the operation and maintenance of irrigation projects,  there  is
both an assurance problem and a question of commitment both for farmers
and government officials.  First, individuals need to have information and
assurance concerning the actions of others.  Second,  the  individuals need
to make some level of commitment for the provisions of O&M.  The  lack of
either information and assurance or commitment usually means inadequate
O&M.
Thus,  one should not be surprised to find the  three general
characteristics  of the assurance problem present in irrigation O&M:
1)  the larger the group of farmers involved in the irrigation
project,  the greater the O&M  (assurance) problem;
2)  the more heterogenous the group served by an irrigation system,
the greater the O&M (assurance) problem, and
3)  the  larger and more heterogenous the group  irrigated,  the
greater  the incentive  to redefine  the group  into small
homogeneous groups  in which O&M (assurance)  is more readily
achieved.
Two additional characteristics of O&M are suggested by the
assurance problem:
4)  the lower the amount of user group participation in system
management, the greater the O&M (assurance) problem.  This  is
because participation increases commitment and provides
information concerning what others are contributing, and
5)  communities can learn over time about the benefits from
providing public goods and the costs of not contributing one's
share.  "It  is  thus possible to explain the evolution of
institutions that provide public goods in terms of prior
information and sample information regarding group behavior."
(Runge, 1984 p.  170)
Renfro and Sparling, 1986,  found that, the more collective projects
in a village, the more likely the villagers were to  cooperate in12
irrigation O&M.  Farmers appear to have learned about the costs and
benefits from cooperative action as well as how to  promote collective
action.
Various incentives  and institutional arrangements can be used to help
provide this assurance.  Establishing water rights either in terms of
quantity or timing or both, provides  information concerning the  likely
actions of others.  Rules concerning the allocation of water among farmers
conveys  information and assurance.  As  systems become larger and more
impersonal  formal penalties must be imposed to obtain the desired
behavior.  Even police forces may be necessary in some  large heterogeneous
irrigation systems to  assure compliance with rules and to enforce fee
collections.  The other option is  to  subdivide large systems and allow
more local decision making concerning O&M.
Coward,  1986,  suggests an interesting alternative which appears to
establish assurances  concerning the actions of other water users  and
commits or  obligates farmers  to  "their"  irrigation project.  He basically
argues  that if farmers make a major contribution to  the construction of an
irrigation project,  they will retain a commitment to operate and maintain
the project.  This  is  partly because  they have established a property
right and partly because they have information about the commitment of
other users to the project.
When government gives farmers the irrigation service,  this  appears to
relieve  the water users of any responsibility for the system.  In
contrast, when farmers create the system,  it  is  theirs and they are
committed to it.  There are alternative ways of achieving such a
commitment or obligation, but Coward's idea of creating irrigation13
property to which farmers  are committed is  an important concept.  One
must be careful that government investment does not create negative
incentives concerning farmer commitment to  an irrigation project.  How
many times have we heard farmers say this  is  the government's irrigation
project and they should operate and maintain it?
In evaluating a country's O&M, one needs  to determine  if
institutional and organization arrangements provide the necessary
assurances to elicit the desired behavior.  One characteristic  to  look for
is whether or not there are  institutions which encourage  or require water
users  to contribute to O&M.  Another  important characteristic  is  the
community's commitment to the irrigation project.  Finally, do water users
feel that others,  including the government,  are contributing their  fair
share?
Model for Evaluating Performance
The model for evaluating O&M in irrigation projects includes four
components:  (1) internal assurances;  (2) external assurances;  (3)
commitment and (4) fairness.  The  first component is  a measure of the
degree to which irrigators  feel confident that other irrigators will
contribute their agreed upon share  to O&M.  External assurance is
concerned with how much confidence irrigators  have that government
officials and water managers will adequately perform their duties.  Will
they deliver the water when the farmers need it and will they help with
maintenance?
The third component is based on the  idea that obligations or14
commitments
6 are required to maintain a group which provides  collective or
public goods  (Hechter, 1987).  Coward suggests that construction or
investing  in a project establishes such commitments.  Farmer participation
in project planning and design also appears to  foster commitment.  In
contrast,  government constructed projects  that do not involve farmers
until it  is  time to collect water fees will not find farmers committed to
the project.
The final component relates  to the degree to which irrigators  feel
that the system is  "fairly"  operated and maintained.  The definition of
fairness will likely have to vary somewhat across projects  and must
include what irrigators  feel  is  fair;  not what outside individuals think
is  fair.  For many countries,  fairness appears to mean some  type of rule
concerning uniform water delivery, which is  generally not physically
possible to implement.  Since fairness varies across projects,  it was
difficult to measure  in a macro level study such as this one.
Performance Indicators
For external assurance,  there are a number of possible  indicators of
performance.  Those that are used in this study  include:
(1)  assurance  that water fees will be used for O&M on the water
users project;
(2)  penalties for inadequate water management including maintenance;
(3)  good communication and information flow among farmers and
irrigation officials;
(4)  clear division of responsibility for O&M;
6This  could be thought of as developing a collective ethic as
compared to pure self  interest, although the  individual benefits  from
collective action and loses  if no collective action occurs.15
(5)  dependable water delivery, both in terms of timing and
quantity, and
(6)  high levels of farmer participation in project management.
The sixth indicator  is also a good measure of internal assurance and
commitment,  since high levels  of farmer participation generally mean that
farmers are committed to cooperating in the provision of O&M.  The  first
indicator would be a good measure of fairness,  since it would provide a
closer link between those who receive  the benefits and those who pay the
costs.  Indicators which emphasize  the control aspects of internal
assurance include:
(1)  penalties for non-payment of water fees;
(2)  financial  incentives  for high levels of water fee collections;
(3)  high priority given to water fee collection, and
(4)  high levels of water fee collections and of farmer
contributions to O&M.
Commitment is  difficult to  measure and overlaps with assurance.
Clearly, commitment could be measured by water user participation and the
level of fee collections.  The  three indicators  of commitment employed in
this study, which are used to measure government rather than farmer
commitment,  include:
(1)  government priority given to efficient water use;
(2)  government priority given to  project maintenance, and
(3)  adequacy of government resources for O&M.
The measures of fairness are not as  extensive as those regarding
assurance.  However,  one can get an idea of the country's concern for
fairness by considering the rules used for water management.  Possible
indicators of fairness  include:16
(1)  rules  governing the levels of water rates  that indicate  a strong
concern for farmers'  capacity to pay,7 and
(2)  rules  allowing for non-payment of fees  if a natural disaster
occurs.
Several other important performance indicators,  that are best suited
for measuring individual  project level performance compared to  objectives,
were not used in this macro analysis.  These include:  (1) the community
of irrigators  past record in providing collective goods;  (2)  water
allocation rules that try to give all  irrigators equal opportunity to
receive adequate water supplies;8 (3) adequacy of project design and
construction;  (4) reliability of water deliveries  relative  to prior
expectations of users;  (5) the status of water rights  for farmers  in the
project and (6) project productivity and sustainability in terms of
output relative  to water availability over  time.  Output measures should
include both crop production and area effectively irrigated over time.
Most of these six indicators  focus  on the problem of providing assurance,
both internal and external.  The first indicator is  somewhat of an
exception,  in that it would be a good measure of both internal assurance
and the commitment that exists in an irrigation community.  The second
indicator is  another exception,  since it  is  a measure of fairness and
equal treatment of users.  Indicators  three and four also have
7This suggests a strong correlation between benefits received and
costs paid by individual farmers.  It also assumes that project benefits
received are directly related to ability to pay.
8This measure could be broadened to  indicate either fair or unfair
rules for allocating water.  For example,  what biases exist in the water
allocation rules,  and who do  they benefit?  An unbiased set of rules would
be those that would be selected if one did not know where in the system
they would be located,  i.e.,  rules selected under a "veil of ignorance"
(Rawles, 1971).17
implications for fairness,  since they both can help prevent a few well-
placed farmers from capturing most of the irrigation benefits.
Finally,  a set of indicators could be developed to measure the
uncertainty involved in the rules for water allocation.  For example, are
the rules well established and equitably monitored and enforced?  Is  there
general understanding and agreement amongst users concerning the rules and
their  implementation?  Do the users generally obey the rules?
Country Experience
The countries selected for evaluation presented a  wide range of
experience.  They ranged from Nepal and Sri Lanka, with a rather poor
record of O&M, to  the Philippines  and Maharashtra State in India,  which
have shown signs of providing improved levels of O&M.  In the case of
Nepal,  the poor performance of government irrigation systems may well go
beyond the organizational and institutional questions  raised in this
model.  The basic question in Nepal may be the lack of technical and
financial resources.  In contrast,  farmer developed and managed systems,
which provide more than 70 percent of Nepal's irrigated area, appear to
have a much better record of performance.
External Assurance
What have the four countries done to resolve any of the external
assurance questions?  In general of the four countries considered, the
government of Nepal showed the least progress towards addressing O&M
problems  (see  table 1).  One exception to this was  the Irrigation
Management Project  (IMP) which was initiated in 1985 with the assistance18
of USAID  (Kadi et al.,  1989).  The project had three objectives:  (1)
implement systematic operation and maintenance procedures;  (2) facilitate
the organization of water user groups and  (3),  initiate,  monitoring,
evaluation and feedback procedures  (Kadi et al.,  1989,  p. 5).  In the
midterm review of the program, the only real accomplishments related to
the second objective.  Water user groups had been established in two field
sites,  but little had been achieved concerning systematic O&M or
monitoring and evaluation procedures.  The  Philippines model was used to
establish the water user groups and appeared to be as effective as  it has
been in the Philippines.  Sri Lanka also  employed the  Philippines model in
its  efforts to  increase farmer participation and improve O&M.
Another strategy tried by Sri Lanka was  to establish special O&M
accounts for each major irrigation project and have the  farmers'
irrigation fees deposited in "their" project's account.  Farmers  then were
to be represented on the committees which were to decide how these funds
would be used.  Thus,  the more fees contributed, the more funds  that would
be available for operating and maintaining "their" system.  Unfortunately,
this policy was not fully  implemented and the fees collected ended up in
general revenues rather than the special accounts.
The lack of information was a particular problem in both Nepal and
Sri Lanka  (Shrestha, 1985).  Their inadequate information system was a
constraint to  efforts to provide more resource for O&M.  For example,  in
Sri Lanka, collection of O&M fees was based on a specific register for
each irrigation system prepared under the supervision of the Government
Agent for  the district.  The register was  supposed to give the name of the
legal allottee and tenant cultivators,  the extent of their paddy holdings19
in the scheme and their location.  Yet, the register was out of date and
failed to  identify accurately those who received water and did not include
any land on which illegal irrigation and cropping had occurred
(Engineering Consultants,  1985).
The Philippines used a slightly different approach than Sri Lanka to
provide a link between fees and funds for O&M.  The government decided to
turn over more management responsibility and even ownership of irrigation
systems to water user organizations  (WUO).  This,  in general,  improved
irrigation performance of the smaller and more homogenous irrigation
projects  (De los Reyes  and Jopillo,  1986).  Where well organized WUO
existed,  they took control of water deliveries and internalized this
important management activity.  They removed one element of uncertainty
from water allocation,  that  is,  the National  Irrigation Agency (NIA).
This changed the external  assurance problem to  an internal one.  As part
of the agreement,  the WUO was required to maintain and operate the system
with resources provided by their members.  The control over water
allocation provided them enough benefits so  that they generally agreed to
take over systems from NIA and even paid capital costs.  In cases where
the irrigation systems were  in poor condition,  irrigators have refused to
take control unless the system was first rehabilitated.
Hunt,  1985, points out the  importance of farmer water control as an
incentive  for system O&M.  He argues that unless the farmers  can derive
some benefits  from operating the system,  they will leave  it to government.
Control over water allocation can provide  such benefits.
The 1976 Philippine water code is  a good example of another serious
attempt to  improve both external and internal assurances concerning water20
supplies.  But because of already existing water rights and the lack of
information, the effectiveness of the law varies widely across  irrigation
systems.  In those systems where the new code was effective,  it helped
improve operational efficiency by providing greater assurances concerning
the actions of others  regarding use of water supplies.
The code  gave control over water development to  the Philippine
government.  The primary implementation tool was the issuance of water
permits.  No person, corporation or government agency could appropriate
water without a water permit.  The permittees were required to pay all
fees and charges imposed by the government.  They were also obligated to
maintain water control and measuring devices,  to keep records of water
withdrawals and report water use information when requested by the
government.  Finally,  water rights must not prejudice the rights of third
parties  (Cruz,  et.al.,  1987,  p. 31).
"The water permit ...  provides the wet and dry season discharge
rate  (in liters per second),  total area to be irrigated,
location of diversion points along the  source,  and the approved
structures  to be installed,"  (Cruz,  et.  al.,  1987,  p. 50).
However,  the process  of issuing water permits was constrained by
information problems.  It has been difficult  to estimate  the water supply
available for appropriation, which resulted in the over-appropriation of
water and a delay in processing of applications  for permits  (Cruz,
et.al.,  1987, p. 74).
Maharashtra has  taken a centralized approach to  irrigation
management.  This poses a slightly different type of assurance problem.
Here they attempted to use control and stiff penalties  to deal with
assurance problems.  When compared to other Indian irrigation programs,
the state has been fairly effective.  They have covered 70  - 116 percent21
of their O&M costs with fees  collected from farmers.  The irrigation
department has been responsible for collecting water fees which gave  them
an incentive to provide a reasonably assured water supply.  If farmers
receive water when they need it,  they are more willing to pay their water
fees  (Abel, 1977).  The government also established clear responsibility
for maintenance so that the  irrigation agency and the farmers knew what
they were expected to provide.  Finally, both farmers and irrigation
officials  appeared to give high priority to  efficient water allocation
because of scarce water supplies.
Internal assurance
The percentage of farmers paying water fees varied widely across
projects and among the four countries  (table 1).  But both the Philippines
and Maharashtra had a much better record of farmers paying their water
fees than did the other two countries.  In Maharashtra,  Pawar, 1985,  found
collection levels of between 58-67 percent of assessments,  even with
relatively high water fees.  They gave a high priority to collecting the
fees, which were supposed to cover O&M costs plus provide a 1 percent
return to the government for  the depreciation costs of irrigation capital.
Water charges  in Maharashtra were varied by crop and season.  The
1983-84 water fees  for surface irrigation ranged from Rs 50  ($3.33) per ha
for kharif (wet) season crops  to Rs  750  ($50) per ha for sugarcane and
plantation crops.9 Other fees  included Rs 75  ($5)  per ha for rabi  (dry)
season crops and Rs 150  ($10) per ha for many hot season crops.  For the
hot season's  cotton and groundnut crops,  the  fees were Rs  200 and 400
9The banknote rate, November 1984, was 15  rupees per U.S. dollar.22
($13.33 and $26.67)  per ha  (Pawar, 1985,  p. 18).  Thus,  charges were
varied by crop and season, based mainly upon crop water requirements,  the
amount of rainfall likely  to occur during the season and the average gross
crop  income.
Although Maharashtra has done better than the other areas studied,
it has not yet reached its  objective of covering O&M costs plus
depreciation.  Part of the reason for this  shortfall was that the
government sets water fees for a 10 year period.  The 1983-84 fees were
the  same as  those for  1975-76 for all surface water  irrigation systems.
With the real value of fees dropping,  total collections have not kept up
with O&M.
Penalties and sanction have been a regular part of the system of
collecting water fees  in Maharashtra.  If water charges were not paid by
the due date,  an extra penalty of 10 percent of the amount due was  added
to the charges.  Sanction could also be imposed,  such as  rejection of a
farmer's application for  irrigation water.  As  a final resort,  the
government could use coercive measures provided for under the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code.  The delinquent payments were added to the land tax and
collected along with the regular land revenue by revenue authorities
(Pawar, 1985).
The Philippines was the only country in the study which used direct
positive incentives  to obtain payments from a higher percent of farmers.
Where water user associations were deputized to  collect fees from members,
they usually received offers of a graduated bonus for achieving certain
collection efficiencies.
"If collection efficiency  (on current account)  is  100%, the
association is given 5% of the total collected fees;  4% if23
collection efficiency is  90%;  3% if collection efficiency is
80%,  and 2% if 70%  efficiency.  The deputized associations are
also given as much as  25% of all back accounts  collected,"
(Cabanilla, 1985,  p. 37).
The Philippine Government also imposed penalties  for non-payment of
water fees,  particularly for tubewell irrigation.  In fact,  the  government
shut down a number of wells because farmers were unable or unwilling to
pay operating costs.  In contrast,  the cut-off rule or legal sanctions
were not enforced in gravity-fed surface systems.  Water control was  not
adequate to allow enforcement of  the shut-off rule for a few farmers on a
canal.  Legal sanctions were also difficult to  enforce because many
delinquent farmers were economically powerful  (Cabanilla, 1985).
The National Irrigation Agency's (NIA) program to  improve water fee
collections was based on the policy that,  "NIA should charge fees  that
are just sufficient to  defray cost of operating and maintaining the
systems,  plus repaying the construction costs within 50 years without
interest.  Thus,  pump systems which entail higher O&M costs charge higher
fees,"  (Cabanilla, 1985,  p. 21  and 24).  However,  the irrigation fees  and
equipment rental fees covered only 37  to  53 percent of NIA's budget during
1978-83 (Cabanilla, 1985).  In 1983,  about 62  percent of the assessed fees
were collected, which amounted to  75 percent of NIA's  total costs of O&M
(Small,  et al.,  1986, p. ix).
To help increase and stabilize collections over time,  NIA tied water
fees  to a given quantity of rice.  Thus,  as  the support price of rice was
increased, water fees were also  raised.  However,  the price of rice did
not keep pace with inflation and water fees have declined in real terms
since 1976.  The  real value of irrigation fees for wet season gravity24
systems dropped from 120 pesos  ($6.15) per ha in 1976,  to only 80 pesos
($4.10) per ha in 1984.10
Four general water fee  levels were used in Philippine government
projects providing water for rice  irrigation.  There were rates  for wet
and dry season irrigation and for pump and surface  (gravity)  irrigation.
For gravity systems irrigating rice, water fees were 50 percent higher in
the dry season than in the wet season.  In gravity systems serving other
annual crops  such as  sugar cane and banana,  the  fees were 60 percent
higher than for dry season rice.  Almost all payments were made  in cash
and were collected twice a year, once after each season  (Cabanilla, 1985).
In communal  systems entirely under  farmer control,  farmer-members could
elected to pay their irrigation fees  in terms of labor for cleaning canals
or  in cash.
In general,  Cabanilla found that the small and medium-sized
irrigation systems had higher collection efficiency than those with
service areas of 5,000 ha and above, and new systems or newly
rehabilitated system had higher collection efficiency than old
unrehabilitated systems.  A larger percentage of small-scale farmers and
upstream farmers paid their water fees  than did large-scale farmers and
mid-stream or tail-reach farmers.  The collection efficiency for  the
sample projects ranged from 27 percent in one pump project to 100 percent
in a communal  gravity flow irrigation system.
In Sri Lanka,  the government's policy on water charges changed over
time.  Before 1970,  the water charge was Rs  5 ($.19) per acre in most
schemes, but in some schemes the  rate was  as  low as half a rupee.11 Even
1OThe banknote rate,  November 1984, was 19.5 pesos per U.S.  dollar.
11The banknote rate, November 1984, was  26.5 rupees per U.S. dollar.25
with these  low rates,  collections were less  than 2 percent.  From 1970 to
1977, water fee collections of any form were virtually abandoned.  During
the early 1980s, new fees of Rs  30  ($1.13) per acre  for cropping intensity
over 150 percent and Rs  20  ($.75) per acre for intensity less than 150
percent were  introduced for irrigated rice land.  Again, collections were
insignificant.
According to  the new 1984 water policy,  farmers in all major Sri
Lankan irrigation systems were to pay the O&M costs of irrigation.  In
1984,  the first year of implementation, farmers were required to pay only
50 percent or Rs  100  ($3.77) of the estimated O&M cost, while the
government was to match the farmers'  contribution.  The contribution by
farmers  for O&M was supposed to be progressively increased by 20 percent
each year so that,  at the end of the fifth year, the entire  sum of Rs  200
($7.55) per acre was to be paid by farmers.
Penalties for non-payment of water charges were also introduced in
Sri Lanka's new program to  increase water fee collections.  The law was
amended to allow action to  be taken against non-paying farmers.  If
farmers did not pay,  they could be prosecuted and fined.  Prior to 1984,
no penalties or  sanctions were imposed on defaulting farmers.  In
addition, there were many farmers who used irrigation water illegally and
were not subject to water charges or penalties.  This, of course, added to
the  internal assurance problem.
The amount of assessments collected up to October 1984 were only
above 2 percent in seven of the seventeen districts.  Only two districts,
with 22 percent and 53 percent respectively, had collection rates over 15
percent, while the average  for all  the districts was only 8 percent.26
Although these collections were higher than the less than 2 percent level
found before  1984, this  is not enough of a change to  suggest a significant
improvement in program effectiveness.
In Nepal,  there were generally no criteria for setting the  level of
water charges.  They were usually fixed on a flat per acre basis by
individual project boards or  the Department of Irrigation,  Hydrology and
Meteorology, with approval by the Ministry of Finance.  Thus,  the water
charge for the Narayani, Kankai and Morang-Sunsari projects was Rs  100
($5.56) per ha per crop, while it was Rs  60  ($3.33)  in the Jhanj,
Manusmara, Chitwan and Patharaiya projects.1 2 Pump irrigation projects
tended to have charges based on hours and cost of pumping.  In the Farm
Irrigation and Water Utilization Division (FIWUD) managed ground water
irrigation projects,  the charge was Rs  16  ($.89) per hour  (Shrestha, et
al.,  1985).
The percent of O&M costs covered by water fees collected in the
sample projects ranged from less than 1 percent in the Kankai and
Manusmara projects to almost 19 percent in the Jhanjh project.  Among
these projects,  the medium-sized projects covered a higher proportion of
O&M costs than did the large projects  (Shrestha, et al.,  1985).  Small, et
al.,  1986,  found average collections of about 20 percent, which were only
about 10 percent of O&M costs.  In contrast,  they found annual farmer
contributions to some farmer owned systems to be as high as Rs  750
($41.67)  to Rs 1000  ($55.56) per ha.
Government collections of established fees were particularly low
during the wet season.  Many farmers seemed willing to pay for dry season
12The banknote rate, November 1984, was 18 rupees per U.S. dollar.27
irrigation but not for wet season irrigation.  They argued that,  in the
wet season,  they had traditionally (before government irrigation) grown a
rice crop without any problems.  Nevertheless, many farmers in Nepal
provided free labor to repair and maintain "their" irrigation systems when
they had tertiary canals.  Where tertiary canals existed, farmers had
usually built them and they were willing to maintain them.  In a sample of
three large projects, 42%  to  95%  of the farmers reported their willingness
to provide free labor  for small repair works, provided that the irrigation
project assured timely supplies of water  (Shrestha, et. al.,  1985, p. 46).
In Nepal,  their cut-off rule for gravity-fed surface irrigation also
could not be enforced, while for tubewell irrigation,  enforcement was not
clear.  According to  Shrestha, et al.,  (1985),  "In tubewell
irrigation...the supply can be stopped for non-payment cases"  (p.  29).
However,  in the farmer survey none of the farmers reported any penalty for
non-payment of water charges or having ever been approached by project
officials to help in project repair or maintenance  (Shrestha, et al.,
1985).
Commitment
As Abel, 1977,  pointed out, commitment by governments to the  idea
that water is a scarce factor of production which must be used efficiently
is  essential for effective water management.  In three of the four case
studies,  commitment at the government level was improving as  Sri Lanka,
the Philippines and Maharashtra all recognized water as a scarce resource
and gave efficient water use a high priority  (see table 2).  They also
appeared to be moving towards giving maintenance a  high priority, although28
the commitment is  less certain for Sri Lanka.  The current record in this
regard needs to be checked against actual performance.  Only Maharasthra
was close to providing enough resources for O&M.
In Maharashtra,  due to  the relative scarcity of water,  irrigation
development has had a high priority since independence.  Even improved
water use was given high priority during the  1970s.  This  does not mean
that operations  and maintenance expenditures have matched requirements.
Still,  expenditures for O&M in a sample of major and medium irrigation
systems were Rs  261  ($17.40)  and 210  ($14) per ha,  respectively (Pawar,
1985).
In Sri Lanka, the government gave  irrigation and water use
efficiency high priority and recognized some of the organizational
problems  (Engineering Consultants,  1985).  The important question is
whether or not the new policy thrust will ever be fully implemented and
the organization problems  resolved, given the current political problems
that plague the country.
Nepal did not give efficient water use  or O&M a high priority.  New
projects have strained the country's ability to operate and  maintain
existing projects.  The best staff go to new projects while  inadequate and
poorly trained staff perform O&M on existing projects.  "The targets  for
irrigation development have  increased over the years,  resulting in a
steady decrease in the budgetary allocation for regular and recurrent
expenditures" (Shrestha, et. al.,  1985, p. 38).  This acts as  a serious
constraint on efforts  to improve implementation of  irrigation projects and
perpetuates a vicious circle.  Irrigation services remain poor,  resources29
for O&M are limited and farmers do not pay water fees  (Easter and Welsch,
1986).
In contrast,  the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in the
Philippines shifted its program emphasis to O&M away from new
construction.  It made progress by focusing increased efforts on
organizing and training farmers to do more O&M.  Yet Cabanilla,  1985,
points to the need to shift budget priorities within O&M.  "The bulk of
O&M expenditures of NIA have been on salaries and wages of personnel,  most
of whom are not directly involved in O&M (Cabanilla,  1985, p. 45-46).
Still,  the high priority given to  efficient water use and the shift in
emphasis to O&M were important first steps in improving O&M.
Fairness
The Philippines has shown some concern for fairness in its general
guidelines for setting water fees.  First,  fees should be within the
farmer's capacity to pay and second, they should not  impair the incentive
to use water.  In fact, capacity to pay was emphasized more  in setting
the water fees than the O&M cost.
Maharashtra had similar provisions prescribed for determining water
fees.  The water charge for a crop should be related to the ability to
pay from crop returns and it should not be set at a level which would
leave any of the  irrigation potential unutilized.  In contrast, questions
of fairness concerning water fee levels will be less important  in Nepal
and Sri Lanka until they significantly raised their levels of collection.
Yet, the uniform rate charged for O&M across all  government
irrigation projects in Sri Lanka shows concern for fairness.  Even though30
O&M costs were not uniform within or among projects,  it was felt that
rates based on actual costs would be unfair.  Since  independence,  the
government has always tended to provide assistance programs on a uniform
basis  (Shrestha, Tek-Behaduer, et.al, 1985).
Even with higher collections,  farmers'  ability  to pay should not be a
constraint.  Small et al.,  (1986)  found in a study of five Asian countries
that O&M costs could be covered with a range of 5 to  33 percent of net
irrigation benefits to farmers.  For Nepal,  it would take only 5 percent
of net benefits to cover O&M costs, while in the Philippines it would
require  10 percent.  In Maharashtra,  the water fees for surface
irrigation on food and non-cash crops were set roughly equal to  6 percent
of the average yearly gross  income from these crops.  In the case  of cash
crops,  the charge was set at about  12 percent of  the average  gross income
(Pawar, 1985, p. 17).
In all  four countries,  farmers appeared to  get water fees waived if a
natural disaster or lack of irrigation water caused crop failure.
However,  it was not clear how these rules were applied and if certain
farmers or groups of farmers received special treatment.
Conclusion
What can be concluded concerning irrigation and the assurance
problem?  First,  farmers are guided in their decisions concerning O&M by
the profit motive, by the stability of expectation (assurance) concerning
the contributions of others and the degree of fairness they perceive in
the system.  Second,  the assurance problem, if modified to  include the31
concern for fairness and commitment,  provides an improved explanation of
farmer behavior regarding provision of O&M for irrigation projects.
There are a number of ways to provide improved external assurance.
The most important is  the delivery of a dependable water supply.  The
other five means of providing external assurance include greater farmer
participation, good communication, penalties for poor water management,
clear responsibility for O&M and water fees spent in the irrigated areas
where they were collected.  All five will help improve water delivery.
External assurance involves building trust between farmers and the water
managers based on good service.
Providing internal assurance can be just as complicated as supplying
external assurance, particularly in large irrigation systems.  Penalties
and other incentives can be used to encourage farmers to pay water fees
and contribute to O&M.  However,  implementing the  institutional and
organizational arrangements required to  establish the  incentives and
impose the penalties is  difficult.  Experience  in providing collective
goods appears  to lower the transaction cost involved in obtaining farmer
participation in O&M.  It may also provide information concerning the
benefits of collective goods and costs of "free riding".  Internal
assurance comes from knowing that other water users will contribute
towards O&M.
If farmers participate directly in system planning and management, it
will provide both internal and external assurance.  The possibilities  for
participation range all  the way from outright construction by farmers as
suggested by Coward, 1986,  to regular meetings between irrigation
officials and farmers to decide on water delivery schedules and32
maintenance.  The  important step is  to get  farmers to make a commitment to
the irrigation project and provide them assurances concerning how it will
be managed.  If they feel  it  is only the governments'  system,  all the well
known problems of inadequate O&M are  likely to occur.
Finally, some shared notation of fairness within the community of
irrigators will  influence their contributions  to O&M.  Rules  governing the
level of water  fees and the allocations of water are  two places where a
degree of fairness can be introduced into an irrigation system.  As one
might expect,  in those systems that have homogeneous and evenly
distributed land resources  (small variance in farm size),  it  is much
easier to provide a "fair"  system of water fees and allocation rules.
A number of important research questions are suggested by the
assurance approach.  For example,  how is assurance and fairness provided
in well operated irrigation systems?  Are there cases where the
contributions towards O&M result in such high returns that  the problems  of
fairness and assurance are of minor concern?  Alternatively,  is  tight
government control a substitute for institutional arrangements  that
provide fairness  and assurance in the operation of an irrigation system?
If government control  is  a substitute, what has been the cost,  including
transaction costs,  of providing such control,  compared to the cost of
providing assurance?  Very likely,  the cost of government control
increases with the size of the irrigation system.  However,  this might be
offset by economies  to  scale in the control and policing of irrigation
systems.  Finally, does  external assurance need to extend all  the way up
to government policies concerning agricultural commodity prices and trade
policy?33
TABLE 1.  INDICATORS OF COUNTRY PERFORMANCE IN
PROVIDING ASSURANCE IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT, 1984
Country
Maharashtra
Indicator  Nepal  Sri Lanka  Philippines  (India)
External Assurance
1.  Link between fees  No  Tried in  In communal  No
and funds allocated  1984-85  projects
for O&M.
2.  Penalties on those  No  No  In communal  Some
not maintaining  projects
the project.
3.  Encourage high  Pilot Project  Yes  Starting  No
farmer partici-  1985  1976
pation.
4.  Good communication  No  No  With active  Not clear




5.  Dependable water  No  No  Improving  Not clear
deliveries.
6.  Clear responsi-  No  No  Improving  Yes
bility for O&M.
Internal Assurance
1.  Portion of assessed  20%  8%  62%  58-67%
water fees collected.
2.  High priority given  No  Starting  Yes  Yes
to fee collection.  1983-84
3.  Penalties  for non-  Not  Starting  Yes  Yes
payment of fees.  enforced  1984
4.  Incentive for high  No  No  Yes  No
rates  of collection.
Source:  Pawar,  1985;  Shrestha,  1985;  Cahanilla,  1985;  ECL,  1985;  Small et al.,
1986.34
TABLE 2.  INDICATORS OF COUNTRY PERFORMANCE IN PROVIDING COMMITMENT
AND FAIRNESS IN IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT, 1984
Country
Commitment  Nepal  Sri Lanka  Philippines  Maharashtra
Indicator
1.  High government  No  Starting  Yes  Yes
priority for efficient  1978-79
water use.
2.  High government priority  No  Changing  Improving  Improving
for maintenance.
3.  Adequacy of government  No  No  Improving  Close
resources for O&M.
Fairness
1.  Ability to pay important  No  No  Yes  Yes
in setting water fees.
2.  Fee payment waived  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
during natural disasters.
Source:  See Table 135
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